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METHODOLOGICAL VERSUS NATURALISTIC LEGAL 
OBJECTIVITY 
KENNETH K. CHING* 
INTRODUCTION 
Han Solo and Luke Skywalker are having a debate. Aboard the Millenium 
Falcon, they have made a timely jump into hyperspace and narrowly escaped 
being obliterated by Imperial Cruisers.1 Luke is with Obi-Wan Kenobi in the 
Falcon’s hold area, and Obi-Wan is teaching Luke how to defend himself 
against a robot’s laser beams using only a lightsaber and the Force. Han enters 
and sees the exercise. The robot blasts Luke in the leg. Han erupts with 
laughter. 
Han: Hokey religions and ancient weapons are no match for a good blaster at 
your side, kid. 
Luke: You don’t believe in the Force, do you? 
Han: Kid, I’ve flown from one side of this galaxy to the other. I’ve seen a lot 
of strange stuff, but I’ve never seen anything to make me believe there’s one 
all-powerful force controlling everything. There’s no mystical energy field that 
controls my destiny. It’s all a lot of simple tricks and nonsense. 
Luke, undeterred, tries again, this time with a blaster helmet covering his 
eyes. The robot fires. Luke, trusting the Force, reacts. Incredibly, he deflects 
the laser. Han is unimpressed: “I call it luck.” 
Han and Luke’s timeless debate about the seen versus the unseen bears on 
law’s legitimacy and objectivity. Law’s legitimacy depends, in part, on its 
objectivity.2 If law is not objective but is biased, subjective, arbitrary or 
 
* Assistant Professor, Regent University School of Law. B.A., University of Nevada-Reno; J.D., 
Duke University School of Law. The author thanks the following people for their suggestions and 
comments on this Article: Judge Richard A. Posner, Dr. Gerald J. Postema, Nathan S. Chapman, 
C. Scott Pryor, Benjamin V. Madison, Whitnae Hallbauer, Michael V. Hernandez, Thomas C. 
Folsom, J. Haskell Murray, and Erin A. Ching. 
 1. STAR WARS EPISODE IV: A NEW HOPE (20th Century Fox 1977). 
 2. See, e.g., Gerald J. Postema, Objectivity Fit for Law, in OBJECTIVITY IN LAW AND 
MORALS 99, 115 (Brian Leiter ed., 2001); cf. Stanley Fish, Almost Pragmatism: Richard Posner’s 
Jurisprudence, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1447, 1462 (1990) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990)) (“Law emerges because people desire predictability, 
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irrational, its subjects should deem law’s use of coercive force illegitimate. So, 
it is important to ask whether law is objective. But before we can ask whether 
law is objective, we need to define legal objectivity. My goal in this Article is 
to accomplish that task by assessing and developing two competing 
conceptions of legal objectivity, one based on the works of Judge Richard 
Posner and Dr. Brian Leiter, and another based on work by Dr. Gerald 
Postema. 
Han Solo would be with Posner and Leiter. In 1990, Posner, in The 
Problems of Jurisprudence,3 forcefully argued that legal objectivity could not 
be meaningfully founded on practical or legal reason, and this argument was 
continued in his other works Overcoming Law4 and The Problematics of Moral 
and Legal Theory,5 published in 1995 and 1999, respectively. In these books, 
Posner held that the best model for legal objectivity was empirical science, and 
he might as well have argued, like Han, that everything else was “tricks and 
nonsense.” In the same vein, Dr. Brian Leiter’s 2007 book Naturalizing 
Jurisprudence argued that legal objectivity should be sought through the 
methods of empirical science, not through a priori reasoning. Leiter would 
likely warmly approve of Han’s assessment: “Hokey religions and ancient 
weapons are no match for a good blaster . . . .” 
Leiter edited a book in 2001, Objectivity in Law and Morals, which 
contained an article “Objectivity Fit for Law,” by Postema. Postema described 
a conception of legal objectivity called “publicity” that was based on public 
deliberative reasoning.6 Publicity is a methodological approach to legal 
objectivity, which holds that by creating legal judgments through a process of 
public, deliberative reasoning these judgments become “objects.” This kind of 
reason-based objectivity is rejected by Posner and Leiter in favor of an 
objectivity based on the methods of empirical science. Objectivity in Law and 
Morals gave occasion for a short debate between Leiter and Postema. Leiter 
claimed that Publicity provided no way of telling between better and worse 
ways of reasoning, and Postema argued that the relevance of empirical science 
to legal objectivity was in doubt.7 But that conversation was truncated and 
underdeveloped, and it was never specifically revisited. In this Article, I seek 
to continue and expand on that conversation by assessing two conceptions of 
legal objectivity. 
 
stability, equal protection, the reign of justice, etc., and because they want to believe that it is 
possible to secure these things by instituting a set of impartial procedures.”). 
 3. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990). 
 4. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW (1995). 
 5. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1999). 
 6. Postema, supra note 2, at 117. 
 7. Postema, supra note 2, at 134. 
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The first conception of legal objectivity to be considered is based on the 
works of Posner and Leiter and is a naturalistic conception. Naturalism 
assesses law’s objectivity based on the extent to which legal judgments 
correspond to empirical facts. It is the Han Solo, ‘blasters over hokey 
religions’ theory of legal objectivity. The second conception we will consider 
is what Postema has called Publicity. Publicity assesses law’s objectivity based 
on whether legal judgments are products of public reason.8 It is a reason-driven 
conception. It is the Luke Skywalker, ‘trust the Force’ conception of legal 
objectivity. There are other conceptions of legal objectivity that are not 
considered in this Article, for example, a conception that assesses law’s 
objectivity based on whether legal judgments conform to an objective, 
ontologically real order—a natural law or moral realist type of objectivity.9 I 
have chosen only to consider naturalistic legal objectivity and Publicity for 
several reasons. First, I wanted to develop the unfinished conversation between 
Postema and Leiter about these two conceptions as being opposed to one 
another. Second, Postema’s conception of objectivity has been virtually 
ignored in secondary literature, and I wanted to specifically draw attention to 
this conception of objectivity. And third, I did not want to distract from these 
goals by also assessing other controversial conceptions. 
This Article makes several contributions to the conversation started by 
Postema and Leiter. It offers a revised version of Publicity. Postema’s version 
includes a “regulative ideal” of agreement among those who participate in 
deliberative discourse, but it expressly does not require any actual agreement 
among those participants.10 I argue the contrary: Publicity does require some 
degree of actual agreement; why and how much I will explain below. Further, 
this Article offers new arguments for preferring Publicity over Naturalism. The 
 
 8. There is a strong relationship between Publicity and John Rawls’s rendering in Political 
Liberalism of six essential elements of a conception of objectivity, and Postema acknowledges 
relying on Rawls to some degree. Postema, supra note 2, at n.26; see JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM 110–12 (1993). The virtue of considering Publicity specifically, as opposed to 
objectivity more generally as described by Rawls, is that Publicity is a conception of objectivity 
directly tailored to law. It could be said that Rawls described a general idea applicable to any 
domain of discourse, which Postema has applied specifically to law. As such, Postema’s 
explication of Publicity is rich and detailed with regard to legal objectivity in a way Rawls’s 
survey of the elements required of any conception of objectivity did not attempt to be. See 
Lawrence B. Solum, Introduction: Situating Political Liberalism, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 549, 567 
(1994) (Solum has noted that Rawls’s concept of political objectivity “is barely explored in 
Political Liberalism.”). 
 9. See, e.g., Christopher Wolfe, Natural Law, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 581, 581 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992) (describing 
natural law as claiming “there is a certain order in nature that provides norms for human 
conduct.”); see also DAVID O. BRINK, MORAL REALISM AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS 22 
(Cambridge University Press 1989) (describing a naturalistic moral realism). 
 10. Postema, supra note 2, at 119. 
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first is that the best argument for Naturalism, that science has been more 
successful than reason, is actually a better argument for Publicity. A second is 
that the best argument against Publicity, the contingency of reason, is actually 
an argument for Publicity’s ability to assess legal objectivity. Also, this Article 
describes an appropriate role for empirical science in a rationalistic approach to 
law like Publicity. 
Part I of this Article describes a naturalistic approach to law and legal 
objectivity. Part II of this Article describes a conception of legal objectivity 
based on public reason, Publicity. I revise Postema’s version of Publicity by 
arguing that for a legal judgment to be objective, judging subjects must come 
to some degree of actual agreement. Part III of this Article argues that 
Naturalism is the wrong approach to legal objectivity for at least four reasons: 
(1) the lack of good reason to privilege scientific epistemology over a reason-
based, rationalistic epistemology; (2) Naturalism’s inability to account for 
normative discourse; (3) scientific epistemology’s lack of relevance to law’s 
legitimacy; and (4) the inability of a naturalistic conception of objectivity to 
assess law’s legitimacy. Part IV of this Article argues that Publicity is an 
appropriate conception of objectivity for inquiring into law’s legitimacy 
because Publicity can assess law’s legitimacy and can account for normative 
discourse, while also being able to incorporate the “successes of science” into 
its framework and adequately address concerns about the contingency of a 
reason-based epistemology. 
I.  NATURALISTIC LEGAL OBJECTIVITY 
This Part describes a naturalistic conception of law and legal objectivity 
and is based on writings by Judge Richard Posner and Dr. Brian Leiter. Their 
work is independent, but it overlaps and describes essentially the same 
naturalistic approach to law and legal objectivity. To summarize their views, 
law is objective only to the extent that legal judgments correspond to empirical 
facts. 
As I discuss a naturalistic approach to law and legal objectivity, I will use 
terms that have close relationships to one another: Naturalism, empirical 
science, and pragmatism. Pragmatism will be used to describe an overarching 
philosophy with Naturalism as its ontology, empirical science as its 
epistemology, and consequentialism as its ethics.11 While this description may 
be oversimplified, it is sufficiently accurate for the purposes of this Article. 
Naturalism, as ontology, defines what exists (“facts”) as that which is mind 
independent and makes a causal difference to the course of our experience. 
 
 11. David Luban, The Posner Variations (Twenty-Seven Variations on a Theme By Holmes), 
48 STAN. L. REV. 1001, 1007 (1996) (“For Posner, pragmatism means being a consequentialist in 
ethics and a moderate skeptic in epistemology.”). 
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Empirical science is the epistemology of Naturalism; it is the method by which 
we know “facts.” And consequentialism (which Posner and Leiter often refer 
to as pragmatism) is an ethical program in which conduct is judged based on 
its consequences, or as Posner or Leiter might put it, based on what “practical 
difference it makes to us.” My use of these terms often overlaps, but the 
meaning of each term should be clear in context. 
Naturalism assumes that reality is identified and described by the empirical 
sciences.12 Blasters are real; the findings of hokey religions are not. 
Naturalistic objectivity is concerned only with “empirical”13 or “observable” or 
“physically existing” facts.14 A fact is naturalistically objective if it (1) is mind 
independent and (2) makes a causal difference to the course of our 
experience.15 Recall Han’s reasons for disbelieving in the Force: “I’ve flown 
from one side of this galaxy to the other . . . but I’ve never seen anything to 
make me believe . . . .” Seeing, is believing. Naturalistic legal objectivity is 
based on the identification of deterministic causes and effects of legal 
phenomena while minimizing or eliminating from legal decision-making non-
empirical factors like morality, theology, human volition, agency, intuition, 
mind, free will, and most normative discourse.16 “There’s no mystical energy 
field that controls my destiny,” says Han. Naturalism is primarily an ontology, 
telling us what does and does not exist. Empirical facts exist; other phenomena 
do not. In short, reality is determined by science, and anything that cannot be 
observed empirically is eliminated by a naturalistic ontology.17 In Han’s 
words, “It’s all a lot of simple tricks and nonsense.” 
The naturalistic approach to law and legal objectivity is based on the 
methods and results of empirical science.18 A naturalistic approach to law leads 
to a program of identifying “an explanatory unification of legal phenomena 
 
 12. BRIAN LEITER, Postscript to Part II: Science and Methodology in Legal Theory, in 
NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE 183 (2007); cf. POSNER, supra note 5, at 13 (While Posner does 
equate the “real” with the “physically existing,” he is careful to note that he is not claiming that 
the only worthwhile knowledge is scientific knowledge, lest he be accused of “scientism.”). 
 13. LEITER, supra note 12, at 185. 
 14. POSNER, supra note 5, at 13. 
 15. Leiter, Objectivity, Morality, and Adjudication, in OBJECTIVITY IN LAW AND MORALS 
66, 67 (Brian Leiter ed., 2001). 
 16. See BRIAN LEITER, Legal Realism, Hard Positivism, and the Limits of Conceptual 
Analysis, in NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE 121, 135 (2007) (hereinafter LEITER, Legal 
Realism); BRIAN LEITER, Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate: The Methodology Problem in 
Jurisprudence, in NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE 153, 180 (2007) (hereinafter LEITER, 
Hart/Dworkin Debate) (citing Jaakko Hintikka, The Emperor’s New Intuitions, in 96 JOURNAL OF 
PHILOSOPHY 127, 143 (1999)); LEITER, supra note 14, at 185; cf. POSNER, supra note 3, at 26. 
 17. LEITER, supra note 12, at 185 (citing the Quinean assumption “that it is within science 
itself, and not in some prior philosophy, that reality is to be identified and described.”). 
 18. Id. at 184. 
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with the other phenomena constituting the natural world . . . .”19 Thus, 
Naturalism incorporates the sciences into law, including anthropology, 
sociology, psychology, and economics.20 Naturalism looks to “social scientific 
literature on law and legal institutions to see what concept of law figures in the 
most powerful explanatory and predictive models of legal phenomena such as 
judicial behavior.”21 A naturalistic approach to law may also consider other 
empirical data like public opinion and customs from around the world.22 Thus, 
a naturalistic legal objectivity would assess law’s objectivity by asking, “To 
what extent are legal judgments based on empirical facts?” 
The incorporation of science into law should lead to “fruitful a posteriori 
research programs”23 and “useful ‘inventions.’”24 The scientific method is 
based largely on the use of controlled or natural experiments.25 The 
incorporation of science into law is meant to allow us to predict,26 understand, 
and perhaps even control our physical and social environment by yielding 
knowledge.27 In a naturalistic approach to law, legal theories should generate 
predictions that are empirically refutable, and then such theories would be 
tested by comparing a theory’s predictions with observable results.28 For 
example, a naturalistic approach to law should lead to judicial decisions being 
determinate and replicable.29 As with natural science, it is sometimes 
impossible, impractical, or unethical to obtain observable results of a theory.30 
In such a case, through indirect evidence or inference, a theory may be 
indirectly, and often reliably, verified.31 
A naturalistic approach to law is about “means,” not “ends.”32 It is like 
Han Solo, who Princess Leia describes as “quite a mercenary” when she learns 
he is only helping her for the money.33 Naturalism prefers “means” because 
 
 19. See LEITER, Legal Realism, supra note 16, at 135. 
 20. Id. at 134; POSNER, supra note 3, at 63 (giving special emphasis to the role of economics 
in understanding and reforming law). 
 21. LEITER, supra note 12, at 184. 
 22. POSNER, supra note 5, at 251–52. 
 23. See LEITER, Legal Realism, supra note 16, at 134. 
 24. See POSNER, supra note 5, at 60; see also POSNER, supra note 3, at 62 (noting that an 
example of a “useful invention” might be pretrial conferences, which may foster settlement by 
reducing uncertainty about trial outcomes). 
 25. POSNER, supra note 3, at 61. 
 26. POSNER, supra note 3, at 26. The scientific approach to law owes much to Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s prediction theory of the law. Id. 
 27. See POSNER, supra note 5, at 14. 
 28. See id. at 13. 
 29. See POSNER, supra note 3, at 7, 125. 
 30. See POSNER, supra note 5, at 13; see also POSNER, supra note 3, at 62. 
 31. See POSNER, supra note 5, at 13. 
 32. See id. at 60. 
 33. STAR WARS EPISODE IV: A NEW HOPE, supra note 1. 
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they are debatable in that they depend on factual assertions such as “this law 
led to a decrease in bankruptcies and interest rates.” But “ends,” or purposes or 
morals, are not debatable because they depend on non-empirical claims about 
values, such as “the number of bankruptcies should decrease.”34 Posner gives 
an example of an argument for free speech:35 free speech leads to intellectual 
progress.36 Posner claims that whether free speech leads to intellectual progress 
is an appropriately debatable question about means because it can be refuted or 
confirmed by facts.37 But, he notes, there are no empirical facts about whether 
we should value intellectual progress; therefore, such a question cannot be 
fruitfully debated.38 A naturalistic approach to law concerns itself only with the 
debatable means, not the non-debatable ends. Debates about means (i.e., 
whether free speech had led to intellectual progress) could be naturalistically 
objective since they can be assessed by empirical facts, but a debate about 
whether intellectual progress should be valued could not be naturalistically 
objective because there is no scientific way to determine what should be 
valued. 
Similarly, naturalistic objectivity is focused on “effects” and “results,” not 
“concepts.”39 “Effects” (like “means”) are empirical facts, but concepts are not. 
Posner gives the example of the doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction (now 
rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court40): 
[I]f there are two possible grounds for dismissing a suit filed in federal court, 
one being that it is not within the court’s jurisdiction and the other that the suit 
has no merit, and if the jurisdictional ground is unclear but the lack of merit is 
clear, the court can dismiss the suit on the merits without deciding whether 
there is jurisdiction.41 
Posner notes that this doctrine is conceptually illogical because a decision on 
the merits presupposes the concept of jurisdiction.42 However, the pragmatic 
approach (which is closely related to Naturalism43) to this question would 
utilize this doctrine because of its effects: (1) dismissing a case on its merits 
will not enlarge federal judicial power, which is the point of jurisdiction in the 
 
 34. POSNER, supra note 5, at 63. 
 35. See id. at 67. 
 36. See id. 
 37. See id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See id. at 242. 
 40. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93–94 (1998). 
 41. POSNER, supra note 5, at 243. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Simply put, pragmatism asks: “What practical difference does it make to us?” The 
incorporation of naturalism into pragmatism can be seen in that naturalism similarly requires that 
for phenomena to be considered a fact, it must “make a practical difference to us” by making a 
causal difference in the course of our experience. 
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first place—keeping powerful courts within their bounds; (2) in a case that 
clearly is without merit, the result will be the same for the litigants regardless 
of which court decides the question; and (3) determining a question that makes 
no practical difference wastes resources.44 Pragmatism requires us to consider 
the results and effects a decision will have when we answer a legal question. 
Posner illustrates a contrary, non-pragmatic, conceptual approach by pointing 
to Justice Scalia’s rejection of hypothetical jurisdiction: “[F]or a court to 
pronounce upon the meaning or the constitutionality of a state or federal law 
when it has no jurisdiction to do so is, by very definition, for a court to act ultra 
vires.”45 Notice that this analysis is entirely formal and conceptual. It is driven 
by the idea of jurisdiction and makes no reference to the effects of the Court’s 
decision.46 Such a judgment is not naturalistically objective because there is no 
empirical fact about what “jurisdiction” is. And because there is no empirical 
“fact” about what jurisdiction is, “jurisdiction” cannot be objectively debated 
or understood: no one can empirically observe jurisdiction and state whether it 
is present in a given case. But effects and results can be observed, and the 
naturalistic approach to law is result-oriented and avoids conceptual 
formalism.47 
This naturalistic approach makes law a practical instrument that is used to 
achieve definite social ends.48 In this way, law would resemble engineering, 
and the lawyer the social engineer who does not choose goals for society, but 
rather makes goals feasible.49 Put differently, a naturalistic approach to law 
must separate the positive inquiry from the normative (whether dismissing the 
case will enlarge federal judicial power versus whether it should do so).50 
Although a naturalistic approach to law is about means not ends, “norms” 
still necessarily play a part in legal analysis. “No type of instrumental 
reasoning can be put to human use without some normative choice, or at least 
without positing some end or goal.”51 In order to know whether means are 
 
 44. POSNER, supra note 5, at 244. 
 45. Id. at 243–44 (quoting Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 101–02). 
 46. See id. at 243–44. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See POSNER, supra note 3, at 14 (discussing Jeremy Bentham as the originator, in a 
limited but important respect, of Posner’s pragmatic concept of law). 
 49. See id. at 63. The sanitized echo of Holmes’s famous statement is unmistakable: “if my 
fellow citizens want to go to Hell I will help them. It’s my job.” Letter from Oliver Wendell 
Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Mar. 4, 1920), in 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE 
OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLD J. LASKI, 1916–1935, at 248 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 
1953). 
 50. See POSNER, supra note 5, at 243–44. 
 51. Gerard V. Bradley, Overcoming Posner, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1898, 1900 (1996). 
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successful, we must know toward what end those means were directed.52 
Posner gives the example of a bankruptcy statute, the goal of which might be 
to reduce the number of bankruptcies and lower interest rates; whether this 
goal was satisfied could be known empirically.53 Although a naturalistic 
approach to law separates the normative inquiry (whether there should be 
fewer bankruptcies and lower interest rates) from the positive, empirical one 
(whether the new statute accomplishes this goal), the naturalistic approach still 
requires a practical goal. Otherwise, the naturalistic project of measuring 
whether the law is advancing the goal becomes unintelligible. 
It is uncontroversial that a naturalistic or pragmatic legal program needs 
norms. But scholars question from where such norms can originate. Pragmatic 
insights to law “in no way dictate which politically contestable theory of 
adjudication or which set of moral values a judge should adopt or allow to 
influence her decisions,” Dr. Eric Rakowski has noted.54 With Leia, we might 
wonder whether the Han Solo approach “really cares about anything . . . or 
anyone.”55 Pragmatic norms cannot come from rationalistic evaluative schemes 
because naturalistic ontology denies the existence of non-empirically verifiable 
entities like “moral values.”56 Thus, Dr. Sanford Levinson has described 
Posner’s approach as being in the spirit of Critical Legal Studies, reducing all 
legal problems to ethical or political problems.57 Professor Gerard V. Bradley 
argues that Posner ultimately only allows norms to be supplied by economics, 
though Bradley also says that Posner looks to evaluative concepts such as 
“progress,” “better,” and “consequences.”58 Most accurately, for the 
pragmatist, laws’ norms are supplied by society’s majority interests.59 
 
 52. See POSNER, supra note 3, at 122; cf. Bradley, supra note 51, at 1908 (“We have heard 
Posner say that economic . . . analysis needs posited ends to get going . . . . But Posner’s 
pragmatism . . . does not generate ends and goals . . . .”). 
 53. POSNER, supra note 3, at 122. 
 54. Eric Rakowski, Posner’s Pragmatism, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1681, 1690 (1991). 
 55. STAR WARS EPISODE IV: A NEW HOPE, supra note 1. 
 56. Except to the extent “moral values” are mental states or attitudes, which may have 
empirically verifiable causal effects. For example, a judge may believe in morality, and that belief 
may affect his judgments. But morality itself, as something free standing apart from people’s 
attitudes or minds, is denied ontological status by naturalism. See LEITER, supra note 12, at 187. 
 57. See Sanford Levinson, Strolling Down the Path of the Law (and Toward Critical Legal 
Studies?): The Jurisprudence of Richard Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence, 91 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1221, 1240–41 (1991). I understand Levinson’s point to be that for both Posner and CLS, 
legal problems are not decided by abstract legal principles. Instead, they are ultimately decided by 
political considerations, such as majority rule. 
 58. Bradley, supra note 51, at 1903–04. 
 59. See POSNER, supra note 5, at 63. 
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“According to Posner, pragmatism . . . relies on social consensus both as a way 
of deciding cases and as a source of legitimacy for judicial decisions.”60 
Naturalism requires that for law to be objective, it must concern itself with 
only empirical facts. This conception has a tense relationship with normative 
discourse, since in many instances norms are not empirical facts and are 
effectively eliminated from a naturalistic reality.61 Yet norms are necessary for 
the naturalistic project to be intelligible, and so naturalists look to social 
consensus to provide legal norms. But normative evaluation does not play a 
role in naturalistic legal objectivity. Instead, Naturalism deems legal judgments 
objective to the extent they are reducible to empirical facts. Correspondingly, 
to the extent legal judgments incorporate non-empirical norms, the naturalistic 
conception of objectivity should deem law non-objective. 
Posner’s and Leiter’s thought bear a strong relationship to that of Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr., Roscoe Pound, and Benjamin Cardozo “in seeing law as 
an instrument for the conscious pursuit of social welfare, an instrument whose 
master term was policy rather than principle, whose master institution was the 
legislature rather than the courts, and whose servants should devote themselves 
to social engineering rather than doctrinal geometry.”62 Like these legal 
realists, Posner and Leiter characterize law as “instrumental problem solving 
rather than detached speculation”—as a “means to an end” meant to promote 
social welfare.63 They seem to agree with these earlier thinkers in locating 
legal legitimacy in democratic consensus.64 Fulfilling Holmes’s prophecy that 
the lawyer of the future “is the man of statistics and the master of 
economics,”65 Posner and Leiter urge “lawyers to become ‘social engineers,’ 
systematically investigating social problems, familiarizing themselves with the 
available methods of reform, and testing whether these had the intended 
effects.”66 Thus, Posner and Leiter are situated neatly in line with thinkers like 
Holmes, Pound, and Cardozo. 
II.  LEGAL OBJECTIVITY AS PUBLICITY 
An alternative to Naturalism is what Gerald Postema has called objectivity 
as Publicity. In general, objectivity has three main structuring features: (1) 
 
 60. Lee Epstein, Jack Knight, & Andrew D. Martin, The Norm of Prior Judicial Experience 
and Its Consequences for Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme Court, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 903, 
951 (2003). 
 61. Except when they exist as empirically-verifiable mental states. LEITER, supra note 12, at 
187. 
 62. Thomas C. Grey, Modern American Legal Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 493, 498 (1996). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 498–99. 
 65. O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897). 
 66. See Grey, supra note 62, at 499. 
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judgments67 must be independent; (2) judgments must be capable of being 
assessed for correctness; and (3) judgments must be intersubjectively 
invariant.68 These structuring features of objectivity apply to any domain, not 
just law.69 When these general features of objectivity are applied specifically to 
legal discourse, legal objectivity requires that: 
(1) Participants in the deliberative process conduct their deliberation only with 
normatively relevant reasons and arguments in view and assess the merits of 
the arguments only by normatively relevant standards; and (2) their 
participation is governed by the overarching aim of achieving reasonable 
common formation of judgment on the basis of the reasons and argument 
publicly offered.70 
It is worth noting that whereas the foundation of naturalistic objectivity is 
empirical facts, the foundation of objectivity as Publicity is non-empirical 
reason, and it would be fair to describe Publicity as rationalistic or reason-
based. Publicity relies on invisible reason to bind the legal universe together as 
Luke Skywalker trusts the Force to bind the galaxy. 
For a legal judgment to be independent, the first structuring feature of 
objectivity, it must transcend the subjectivity of the person engaged in the 
activity of judging (the “judging subject”).71 It must not be the product of 
improper factors like bias, idiosyncrasy, or ideology.72 Rather, it should be the 
product of proper, normatively relevant reasons.73 
For a legal judgment to be capable of being assessed for correctness, the 
second structuring feature of objectivity, there must be standards for assessing 
a judgment’s correctness, and these standards cannot simply be a judging 
subject’s belief or opinion.74 The structuring feature of “correctness” has three 
implications. First, it implies the possibility of mistake.75 Standards that can 
justify can also condemn. Second, judgments must be conclusions of a process 
of deliberative reasoning.76 By justifying a judgment based on standards of 
correctness, interlocutors must exchange reasons for their judgments and 
deliberate over the correctness of a judgment. Third, because discourse is 
conducted by reference to standards, both agreement and disagreement are 
 
 67. By “judgments,” Postema means “claims, assertions, and assessments.” Postema, supra 
note 2, at 105. 
 68. Id. at 107–08. 
 69. Id. at 105. 
 70. Id. at 118. 
 71. Id. at 105. 
 72. Postema, supra note 2, at 106. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 107. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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intelligible (as opposed to mere mute assertions of opposition).77 Standards for 
assessing correctness allow one judging subject to explain that his judgment 
satisfies the standard and another judging subject to explain why it does not. 
This can be contrasted with a disagreement without reference to standards, in 
which there is no possibility of deliberative reasoning but only unintelligible 
opposition. Relatedly, reasoning by reference to standards may create a path 
for moving from disagreement to agreement (and vice versa).78 
Before moving on, it is worth noting the heavy lifting done by “reasons” 
and “standards” in Publicity. Both are the key to their respective structuring 
features. Both must not equal the solely subjective beliefs or opinions of the 
judging subject. Both must be publicly accessible. It is likely that whether we 
can endorse objectivity as Publicity depends on whether proper reasons and 
standards of correctness can carry their allotted burdens. Given their 
importance to Publicity, one wants to know some things about these “reasons” 
and “standards.” For example, who says which reasons are “proper” or 
“normatively relevant”? And one may be disappointed to learn that Publicity 
does very little to answer such questions. However, I briefly suggest an 
analogy that may explain why Publicity says little about the content of its 
reasons and standards. Publicity is more like procedural law than substantive 
law. Publicity itself does not specify the substance, content, or nature of its 
reasons and standards. Instead, its job is to insist that judgments are created 
through a process of deliberating based on reasons and standards. This Article 
attempts to demonstrate that this procedure or method is enough to assess 
whether law is objective. 
Returning now to the structuring features of objectivity, the third feature is 
intersubjective invariance, meaning that there exists the possibility of different 
judging subjects confirming or disconfirming a given judgment based on 
standards of correctness and proper reasons.79 Intersubjective invariance acts 
like a test for whether a judgment is based on proper reasons and standards of 
correctness. “The important general point to record here is that it must be 
possible for other [judges] to assess a judgment, and confirm or disconfirm it, 
if it is to count, even at the limit, as objective in principle.”80 Notice something 
interesting here. A judgment could be objective even when other people look at 
it and “disconfirm it.”81 How is this so? 
Consider the analogy of the math teacher who requires her students to 
“show their work.” When she assigns her students math problems, she does not 
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 79. Id. at 108–09. 
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want them to state only their answers to the problems. She wants them to show 
the steps they took to arrive at their answers. If the students do so, the teacher 
is able to “confirm or disconfirm” their answers objectively. Because the 
students have shown their work and because their reasoning is subject to 
mathematical “standards of correctness,” the students’ answers can be deemed 
objective even if they are wrong. Intersubjective invariance requires a similar 
process. It requires judges to justify their legal judgments based on proper 
reasons and standards of correctness and to offer their judgments to others, 
publicly. This allows others to objectively confirm or disconfirm such 
judgments. 
This highlights that the conception of objectivity being applied here is 
methodological. This conception of objectivity is about process. Objectivity in 
this sense arises from arriving at judgments through a public, deliberative 
process. If we subject our judgments to this process, they become “objects,” 
things that other people can observe and confirm or disconfirm.82 
Assuming that intersubjective invariance were achieved, it would be 
unlikely the judgment is a product of mere subjectivity. It would demonstrate 
that the reasons and standards justifying the judgment transcend the judging 
subject. It is not a perfect test because it is possible that all judging subjects are 
systematically biased, merely sharing the same improper biases or ideologies 
or idiosyncrasies. The judging subjects may all agree not because their 
judgments are objective, but because they have become a “hegemonic 
convention.”83 However, intersubjective invariance is a necessary feature of 
objectivity because its absence would support too compellingly the charge that 
a judgment was merely subjective. If no one could even theoretically confirm 
or disconfirm his or her judgments, it seems dubious that the proper reasons 
and standards of correctness are functioning or even functional. If reason is 
functioning correctly, intersubjective invariance should be possible. Other 
judges must be able to meaningfully evaluate a given legal judgment. 
Intersubjective invariance provides us with assurances that judgments are not 
merely subjective but are based on reasons and standards independent of and 
external to ourselves.84 
Because intersubjective invariance is a structuring feature of objectivity, it 
may not seem to follow that Postema’s version of Publicity does not require 
actual agreement among judging subjects.85 (Note that intersubjective 
invariance is different than agreement.) Postema states that agreement among 
 
 82. Postema, supra note 2, at 124 (“Clashes in public over the proper and reasonable 
understanding of past decisions . . . are signs that the products of the system can claim the right to 
be taken seriously as products of a credible structure of public practical deliberation.”). 
 83. Leiter, supra note 15, at 86. 
 84. Postema, supra note 2, at 121. 
 85. Id. at 120–21. 
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judging subjects, rather than being a precondition to or expected result of 
objective deliberation, is a “regulative ideal.”86 Later in this Article, I will 
argue that Publicity requires some degree of actual agreement: either a 
preponderance of agreement or increasing agreement over a reasonable amount 
of time.87 But for now, I will focus on describing the “regulative ideal” of 
agreement. 
The regulative ideal’s purpose is to influence the deliberative process 
toward objectivity by imposing discipline and constraints on the process and its 
participants.88 Again, the deliberative process has two standards: 
(1) Participants in the deliberative process conduct their deliberation only with 
normatively relevant reasons and arguments in view and assess the merits of 
the arguments only by normatively relevant standards; and (2) their 
participation is governed by the overarching aim of achieving reasonable 
common formation of judgment on the basis of the reasons and arguments 
publicly offered.89 
These standards discipline the process’s participants to argue reasonably and to 
offer their arguments and reasons to each other.90 The goal is to justify one’s 
judgments to others in terms one believes all can recognize and affirm.91 Thus, 
the participants must discipline themselves not to offer arbitrary, idiosyncratic, 
or prejudiced reasons for their judgments because, given the regulative ideal of 
agreement, they can have no expectation that other participants in the process 
will find them persuasive or could come to share such reasons.92 
Agreement as a regulative ideal, as opposed to an expected outcome of 
objective deliberation, may also be better understood once we have considered 
the role of disagreement in objectivity. Objectivity’s goal is “strong 
deliberative consensus . . . based on a full and open public articulation and 
assessment of all relevant reasons and arguments.”93 This goal requires 
objectivity to provide opportunities for disagreement or any consensus 
achieved would not be the result of full, public, reasoned deliberation. Such a 
consensus could instead be the product of the exclusion from the process of 
members of the community or minority arguments.94 However, if deliberative 
discourse values and respects disagreement, it demonstrates that the process is 
properly open to interlocutors and arguments. “Divergence . . . signals that the 
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techniques of reason and argumentative insight are playing a vigorous role in 
the law.”95 Opportunities for public disagreement are essential to a deliberative 
process’s claim to objectivity.96 
Disagreement may also promote objectivity by exposing certain reasons 
and arguments as biased, prejudiced, exclusionary, or unreasonable.97 
Disagreement in the deliberative process encourages the idea that the process 
can be self-correcting.98 Objectivity as Publicity does not guarantee that 
improper reasons or standards will never prevail in deliberative discourse, but 
the opportunity for disagreement and dissent creates the possibility that such 
improper reasons or standards can be challenged, discarded, and corrected. 
The regulative ideal of agreement also has the important quality of 
requiring that agreement be achieved by reason and not force.99 Publicity 
requires that reasons for a judgment must be those that could be accepted by 
all. Such acceptance is an important component of legitimacy, the very reason 
for seeking legal objectivity. 
Publicity is a reason-based conception of objectivity. Unlike Naturalism, 
Publicity does not eliminate but incorporates non-empirical, normative 
discourse. But this requires Publicity to explain how a judgment can be 
objective if it cannot be verified by reference to empirical facts, a question that 
will be considered at length in Part IV of this Article. 
Finally, whereas Naturalism is primarily an ontology (reality is empirical 
fact) that is closely related to an epistemology of empirical science, Publicity is 
a methodology that is not committed to a particular ontology. Publicity is a 
process for creating legal “objects.” It is based on adherence to this process 
that Publicity assesses whether a legitimating objectivity can be ascribed to 
legal judgments. Having described the naturalistic and methodological 
conceptions of legal objectivity, this Article now turns to evaluating these 
conceptions’ merits. 
III.  WHY NOT NATURALISTIC OBJECTIVITY? 
Legal objectivity should not be defined in naturalistic terms. First, the 
success of science is not a good reason to prefer empirical science over non-
empirical reason. Second, normative discourse is an ineliminable feature of 
law, and Naturalism’s attempts to eliminate or separate it are futile and 
unhelpful. Third, scientific epistemology has limited relevance to law. Fourth, 
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a naturalistic conception of legal objectivity has no ability to assess legitimacy 
and is the wrong conception of objectivity for assessing law’s legitimacy. 
A. The Significance of Science’s Success 
For the purpose of assessing whether law’s use of coercive force is 
legitimate, this Article asks whether legal objectivity should be defined in 
terms of Naturalism or Publicity. The primary argument in favor of a 
naturalistic approach to law and legal objectivity over a reason-based 
approach, Posner and Leiter argue, is that empirical science has been more 
successful than non-empirical reason.100 “Hokey religions and ancient weapons 
are no match for a good blaster at your side . . . .”101 
This is a pragmatic argument and should be distinguished from a 
metaphysical one102 on which Posner and Leiter claim not to rely: they do not 
claim that science provides philosophically certain knowledge.103 The 
pragmatic approach “dislikes metaphysics”104 because metaphysics makes no 
difference in the real world. “There’s no mystical energy field that controls my 
destiny,” as Han Solo might say. Posner writes, “There are no conceptual 
entities; the meaning of an idea lies not in its definition, its Form, its relation to 
other ideas, but rather in its consequences in the world of fact.”105 Posner 
argues that we should not be asking questions about conceptual entities that are 
inconsequential in the real world; instead we should consider “[w]hat practical, 
palpable, observable difference does it make to us?”106 This same pragmatism 
can be seen in Leiter’s definition of “fact”: a “fact” must make a causal 
difference in the course of our experience.107 As Leiter notes, “[T]he only 
possible criteria for the acceptance of epistemic norms—norms about what to 
believe—are pragmatic: we must simply accept the epistemic norms that work 
 
 100. For Posner and Leiter, “success” seems to primarily refer to technological advances. See 
LEITER, supra note 15, at 71 (“[Science] sends the planes into the sky, eradicates certain 
cancerous growths, makes possible the storage of millions of pages of data on a tiny chip.”); 
POSNER, supra note 3, at 66–67 (discussing the “atom bomb.”) 
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for us (that help us predict sensory experience, that allow us to manipulate and 
control the environment successfully, that enable us to ‘cope’).”108 
So, the turn to empirical science and away from non-empirical reason 
follows for Posner and Leiter because while science has “worked for us,” non-
empirical methods have not: a scientific epistemology deserves to be 
privileged over a rationalistic one because of “the tremendous success such an 
epistemology has enjoyed to date. To simply push the scientific epistemology 
aside opens the ontological floodgates to a whole pre-Enlightenment 
conception of the world that we seem to do better without.”109 “[T]he 
philosophical track record of all forms of a priori analysis, conceptual or 
intuitive, is not especially encouraging.”110 “Science—not moral insight—has 
made us more civilized . . . .”111 
As Leiter argues: 
[S]cience . . . , and the norms of a scientific epistemology . . . are the highest 
tribunal not for any a priori reasons, but because . . . science has . . . “delivered 
the goods”: it sends the planes into the sky, eradicates certain cancerous 
growths, makes possible the storage of millions of pages of data on a tiny chip, 
and the like.112 
Describing this scientific epistemology, Leiter says that “[w]ith respect to 
questions about what there is and what we can know, we have nothing better to 
go on than successful scientific theory.”113 Posner argues similarly.114 He 
concedes that science’s epistemological foundations are uncertain but argues 
that science should be privileged epistemologically because of its practical 
successes. “Although every bit of what we now believe about the nature of the 
universe may eventually be overthrown, in the meantime ‘science reveals 
hidden mysteries, predicts successfully, and works technological wonders.’”115 
Meanwhile, in the backwater world of pure reason, Posner claims there are no 
“useful ‘inventions’ embodying moral theory.”116 So, the chief reason for 
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privileging a scientific or naturalistic epistemology, and correspondingly to 
define legal objectivity in terms of empirical science, is because science is 
successful. 
This argument seems plausible at first. The successes of science are 
obvious and dramatic, and few people want to return to the Dark Ages. But it 
turns out to be impossible to argue that science has been successful while 
rationalism or other forms of a priori analysis have not. Notice how the claim 
“science is successful” is fraught with normative implications. To claim that 
science is “successful” or that it “works” is a normative evaluation. In what 
way is science successful? Leiter notes that science eradicates some cancer. 
Why is that a success? It is a success because it preserves human life, which 
we value. But the value of human life cannot be identified by empirical 
science. The value of human life emerges from non-empirical, normative 
discourses like morality, theology, and philosophy. Without such normative 
discourse, the claim that “science is successful” is unintelligible. Yet it is 
precisely such normative discourse that is eliminated in Posner and Leiter’s 
Naturalism. It is tellingly inconsistent to impugn normative discourse while 
resting your entire system on the normative claim that science is successful. It 
resembles the child who kills his parents and pleads for the mercy of the court 
on account of being an orphan. 
Maybe it isn’t chutzpah but dubious metaphysics. Pragmatists may dislike 
metaphysics, but “[t]he price of having contempt for philosophy is that you 
make philosophical mistakes.”117 Posner and Leiter strenuously avoid claiming 
to be doing metaphysics or making a priori claims. Attempting to insulate 
themselves against charges of scientism or verificationism, both Posner and 
Leiter volunteer that scientific epistemology is not privileged a priori; they are 
not claiming scientific knowledge is philosophically certain.118 Posner, for 
example, denies what would be a metaphysical claim that “the only worthwhile 
knowledge is scientific knowledge . . . .”119 But his best efforts to avoid 
metaphysics fail, among other reasons, because he is not satisfied with giving a 
descriptive account of law; he also wants to advocate an approach to law. 120 
Posner wants to talk about not just what law is but about what law ought to be. 
He notes that “[t]he notion of using the scientific method to guide social 
reform is quintessentially pragmatic.”121 Unfortunately, “Posner’s elimination 
of ‘soft’ concepts from ethics leaves something of a [normative] vacuum.”122 
One cannot guide social reform without non-empirical norms (i.e., the value of 
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life, the value of knowledge, etc.), and those norms live in the realm of 
metaphysics, not empirical science. Posner may dislike metaphysics, but he 
needs it if he wants to offer any advice. “The problem is that Posner . . . wants 
it both ways. He wants both to puncture the philosophical balloon, obviating 
the need to engage in messy philosophical arguments, and to toss off 
controversial philosophical propositions of his own . . . .”123 And then we have 
Leiter, who denies the a priori of science but embraces the Quinean assumption 
that science identifies and describes reality.124 Who can accept that Leiter is 
not making a priori or metaphysical claims while simultaneously assuming the 
definition of reality?125 Professor Steven Macias has said, “I do not think Leiter 
would deny that he has replaced God or Truth with Science as the ultimate 
arbiter of many human beliefs and practices.”126 Leiter can call his naturalism 
not metaphysics or not a priori, but “it can be very difficult to see the 
difference between the Quinean naturalistic account and one which sees certain 
norms as a priori.”127 
Even if we take Posner and Leiter at face value as not making a priori 
claims, pragmatically (“what practical difference does it make?”), they are still 
making such claims. Posner and Leiter argue the law should be reformed to 
account only for empirical facts. The practical difference this makes to us is 
that non-empirical factors like morals and norms go away. This is the same 
result we would get if we embraced a priori that empirical science defined 
reality, the very metaphysical claim Posner and Leiter have tried not to make. 
All this is to say that the success of science is not a good stand-alone 
argument for a naturalistic approach to law or legal objectivity or against a 
reason-based approach. Of course, science has been successful. But to claim 
that science has been successful depends on normative discourse.128 Normative 
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discourse not only enables us to assess whether science is successful; it is 
responsible for science’s success. 
Leiter claims “science . . . sends the planes into the sky . . . .”129 But it 
doesn’t. People informed by their normative goals send planes into the sky. 
People only use science as a means to help build airplanes. Or consider 
medicine. No one looked into a microscope and empirically discovered that we 
should use medicine to preserve human life. Rather, someone believed—
because of normative discourse—that we should value human life or that we 
should value knowledge and only then looked into a microscope. We only 
believe that we should preserve human life or value knowledge because of 
normative discourse, and this normative knowledge directs and defines any 
successful uses of our scientific knowledge.130 Non-empirical normative 
discourse is necessary not only for assessing science’s success, but also for 
directing scientific projects toward any such success. 
This also refutes Posner’s argument that there have been no useful 
inventions embodying moral theory and Leiter’s claim that the track record of 
a priori analysis is not particularly encouraging. The successes of science are 
useful inventions embodying moral theory. Science itself is a useful invention 
of moral theory. Take an example given by Posner of the success of science: 
the atom bomb.131 Posner seems correct that the atom bomb represents a clear 
progression of knowledge. But who says knowledge is valuable or good? 
Moral philosophy does,132 but moral philosophy is precisely the kind of 
normative discourse Posner and Leiter want their naturalistic programs to 
eliminate from legal reasoning.133 Yet it is normative discourse and only 
normative discourse that directs us to value knowledge. Scientific enterprises 
are only pursued because of the normative beliefs that knowledge is good and 
that we should have more of it. Science and all its useful inventions are 
themselves useful inventions of normative discourse. 
Now is a good time to address Leiter’s related argument that non-
naturalistic reasoning cannot provide the basis for objective judgments. A non-
naturalistic conception of objectivity, like Publicity, Leiter argues, “will often 
be unable to make sense of better and worse ways of reasoning.”134 Based on 
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the foregoing, we can see that if this is correct, Posner’s and Leiter’s 
arguments in favor of science must be abandoned as they rely on non-
naturalistic reasons like “success” and “value.” However, a better response to 
Leiter’s argument is to argue that non-naturalistic reasoning is often able to 
make sense of better and worse ways of reasoning. Of course, Leiter is right 
that science has been successful. Of course we’re better off with airplanes and 
medicine than witches and leprechauns. But notice that this judgment—that 
science is successful, that science is a better way of reasoning than 
superstition—is a non-empirical judgment. It appears, then, that non-empirical 
reason is able to make sense of better and worse ways of reasoning, at least 
when it comes to the examples Leiter picks out. 
To summarize, Posner and Leiter’s primary argument for privileging 
scientific epistemology over a reason-based epistemology is that science has 
been successful but reason has not. This argument is self-refuting. They claim 
that normative discourse like morality and metaphysics should be eliminated 
from the law because they are non-empirical and have been unsuccessful. They 
then claim scientific epistemology should be privileged because science has 
been successful. But this claim actually validates the very normative discourse 
they try to dismiss. 
The argument that “science is successful” cannot justify privileging 
empirical science over non-empirical reason as either a general approach to 
law or as a conception of legal objectivity. Posner and Leiter’s primary 
argument for favoring science over reason fails. We will now consider other 
reasons why a naturalistic conception of legal objectivity is the wrong one. 
B. The Ineliminability of Normative Discourse 
Even assuming that normative discourse is problematic or unsuccessful, 
the naturalistic program is no help. Normative discourse cannot be eliminated 
from the law. “The complete elimination of normative evaluation is 
unattractive, not least because it appears to be impossible.”135 Any principled 
pragmatism,136 Naturalism, or empirical science can only tell us about 
“means,” not “ends.” It can tell us how to do something, but not whether we 
should do it. Only normative discourse can tell us what we ought to do; only 
normative discourse can supply the “ends” that direct our “means.” And law 
will always require ends or purposes. It will always require normative 
discourse no matter how “scientific” its means become. 
One might say Leiter has never argued norms could be completely 
eliminated from law; in fact, he has said the opposite. He too has said norms 
are ineliminable. The problem is that the norms Leiter calls ineliminable aren’t 
 
 135. Redmayne, supra note 129, at 859. 
 136. Admittedly, the phrase “principled pragmatism” may be oxymoronic. 
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the ones that matter. “Norms and the ‘internal point of view’ are ineliminable 
features of the causal structure of the social world,” Leiter writes, “but, for 
naturalists, causality is still the benchmark of reality, and so no responsible 
naturalized jurisprudence can eliminate the normative aspects of law and legal 
systems.”137 One might breeze through this statement and be misled into 
thinking that Leiter is reserving some role in law for normative discourse. He 
isn’t. Leiter’s way of “responsibly” accounting for norms138 is by locating 
them within causal mental states.139 So, for example, a judge may subscribe to 
a certain ideology or value, and it is an empirical fact that the judge subscribes 
to this value.140 The empirical fact that the judge has such a “mental state” may 
make a causal difference in the course of our experience by causing the judge 
to decide cases in certain ways.141 Thus, the reality of the value or ideology or 
norm of the judge can be identified by a naturalistic epistemology, and it is in 
this way that Naturalism has a place for norms. Posner similarly describes 
morality as “facts about people’s attitudes, much like ‘mental externalities.’”142 
This is unresponsive to the argument that Naturalism eliminates normative 
discourse from law. Identifying norms with mental states or facts about 
people’s attitudes is merely descriptive (which Posner acknowledges).143 This 
may seem useful for Leiter’s purported descriptive project of answering what 
he considers “the central jurisprudential question—what is law?”144 But it 
gives no help in answering the question “What should law be?” That is the 
prescriptive, normative question. And it is the answers to that question—the 
normative answers—that are eliminated145 by Leiter’s Naturalism and 
“rendered invisible” by Posner’s scientific approach.146 
This discussion hearkens back to H.L.A. Hart’s criticism of the external 
predictive theory of law of which Posner and Leiter are proponents: 
One of the difficulties facing any legal theory anxious to do justice to the 
complexity of the facts is to remember the presence of both these [the internal 
 
 137. LEITER, supra note 69, at 4. 
 138. LEITER, supra note 12, at 187. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Bradley, supra note 51, at 1913. 
 143. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 36 (1995) (“The statement that it is wrong to 
torture children . . . is merely a descriptive statement about our morality, not a normative 
statement . . . .”); see Bradley, supra note 51, at 1913. 
 144. LEITER, supra note 12, at 189. 
 145. Cf. Redmayne, supra note 127, at 854 (noting that naturalism robs evidence scholarship 
of its normative content). 
 146. See Bradley, supra note 51, at 1904; LEITER, supra note 12, at 187 (“That scientific 
accounts of social phenomena have room, in principle, for Hermeneutic Concepts does not show, 
of course, that they make room for the kinds of Hermeneutic Concepts to which conceptual 
jurisprudents are attached.”). 
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and the external] points of view and not to define one of them out of existence. 
Perhaps all our criticisms of the predictive theory of obligation may be best 
summarized as the accusation that this is what it does to the internal aspect of 
obligatory rules.147 
A naturalistic account like Leiter’s or Posner’s tends to define out of existence 
normative discourse, which does not do justice to law which necessarily 
includes normative discourse. 
Further, there are great tensions between Leiter’s primary descriptive 
project of asking and answering “What is law?” while also engaging in the 
prescriptive project of telling us why law should be naturalized or what law 
should be. Leiter notes that his naturalization project probably makes no 
difference to questions about the norms of a democratic society.148 How can 
Leiter hold that science defines reality, leading to the elimination of many 
concepts to which legal thinkers are attached, and yet claim that this position 
makes no difference to intelligible questions about the norms of a democratic 
society? Perhaps Leiter is an external but not internal skeptic about democratic 
norms?149 That is, maybe as a participant in our democratic society, Leiter 
believes questions about democratic norms are perfectly intelligible, but as a 
legal philosopher he believes democratic norms do not exist from the scientific 
point of view? It seems hard to wear both those hats, that is, believing 
democratic norms are not real but still taking normative discourse about them 
seriously, not as mental states, but as they are discussed within the practice of 
democracy as evaluative claims. It is like an atheist trying to take prayer 
seriously, and not as a sociological phenomenon, but as a petition made to 
God. If Leiter wants to engage in a truly naturalistic descriptive project, which 
should lead to a skepticism about values “all the way down,”150 he should, in 
principle, exclude himself from any prescriptive projects. 
We have seen that mental states are an insufficient way of accounting for 
the ineliminability of norms in law, and now we will consider the role of norms 
in Posner’s pragmatic program. Posner has explained in some detail how his 
pragmatic program would work, including where norms fit in, but this 
explanation demonstrates why normative discourse in law is inescapable. He 
describes a hypothetical scenario:151 a bankruptcy statute is enacted. Its 
purpose is to decrease the number of bankruptcies. It can then be empirically 
 
 147. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 91 (2d ed. 1994). 
 148. See BRIAN LEITER, Why Quine is not a Postmodernist, in NATURALIZING 
JURISPRUDENCE 146 (Brian Leiter, ed., 2007). This seems to be a tacit admission of Dworkin’s 
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supra note 125, at 89. 
 149. See Dworkin, supra note 125, at 92–93. 
 150. Id. at 89. 
 151. POSNER, supra note 3, at 122. 
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tested whether the statute has served its purpose by simply looking at whether 
the number of bankruptcies do, in empirical fact, decrease. If the statute fails to 
achieve its goal, it would be repealed. Such a law would be a method of social 
engineering, and it would be “susceptible of objective evaluation . . . .”152 It 
would be hard to think of a clearer example of a pragmatic legal program or a 
pragmatic conception of legal objectivity. But this example simply 
demonstrates the impossibility of eliminating normative discourse from law. 
The norm in this scheme is that bankruptcies should be decreased, and this 
norm is not empirically discoverable.153 So, even a model of a pragmatic law 
depends for its intelligibility on normative discourse. Of course, Posner grants 
norms a role in his program, and those norms come from social consensus.154 
But if normative discourse is fundamentally problematic, Posner’s pragmatic 
program has done nothing to help. If normative discourse is fundamentally 
flawed, why should we feel better about society doing it instead of judges? 
Oddly, this example also suggests that the pragmatic program has no 
application to litigation and provides no help to a judge. In Posner’s scenario, 
the statute is in effect. For the sake of concreteness, let’s say the law is that “no 
one shall declare bankruptcy more than once every ten years.” Its goal is to 
reduce bankruptcies. At some juncture, the legislature or some law-making 
body will revisit the law to see whether bankruptcies have decreased. If not, 
the law will be repealed. So a legislature may take this pragmatic approach, but 
it is no help to a judge or litigant. In a given case, a party could not argue the 
law should be repealed nor could a judge repeal it. The issue in any given case 
would be whether the law applied, not whether the law should be repealed. 
Knowing that the law’s purpose was to decrease bankruptcies wouldn’t help 
the parties or the judge. Assume a creditor argued as follows. Under the rule, a 
debtor shouldn’t be allowed to declare bankruptcy even though the debtor had 
not declared bankruptcy in the previous ten years. The reason for this, the 
creditor argues, is because the law’s goal was to reduce bankruptcies, and 
allowing the debtor to declare bankruptcy would contravene the law’s purpose. 
This would render the law meaningless, effectively making the law’s purpose 
the law itself. This process and result are not at all what Posner is describing. 
Knowing the goal of the law (even a goal that can be empirically tested) is no 
help to litigants or judges because a judge must apply the law, not the law’s 
purpose. The only way this pragmatic program could help the judge is if the 
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goal of the law were the law and judges were authorized to make rulings to 
effectuate the goal. Posner is not suggesting such a radical program. Posner’s 
pragmatic program offers no help in the process of judicial decision-making, 
and commenters have lamented Posner’s failure to describe how a judge might 
actually go about judging pragmatically.155 As Rakowski notes, “[P]ragmatism 
carries no firm implications for judging . . . .”156 
Recall that Posner and Leiter want normative discourse separated from 
positive legal discourse, if not eliminated altogether, because science has been 
successful and normative discourse has not.157 Assuming that is true, 
separating the normative from the positive is of little value. Since the 
elimination of normative discourse from law is impossible, the question 
becomes: Where does law get its norms? The answer is that norms come from 
social consensus, probably through democratic institutions like legislatures.158 
But if normative discourse is problematic, why is this desirable? Leiter 
applauds science’s ability to eliminate from our world leprechauns and gods 
and ethers and theology and morality, and he worries about allowing pre-
Enlightenment entities into our legal discourse.159 Yet if the normative 
discourse is carried on at the legislature or through some other democratic 
process, the leprechauns live on. How does it matter if they live in the 
legislature or the voting booth instead of the courthouse? The alleged failings 
of normative discourse will not be improved by having voters or legislators 
conduct it instead of judges. Posner’s argument could be put in Holmesian 
terms: we live, largely, by majority rule; thus the people via the legislatures 
should set the goals, and lawyers and judges should be the social engineers 
who figure out how to facilitate those goals.160 That seems coherent. But if this 
is the pragmatic answer, in no way does it eliminate non-empirical norms or 
diminish the problems of normative discourse. Normative discourse is 
ineliminable from law, and a naturalistic program solves none of its alleged 
problems. 
C. The Limited Relevance of Science to Law 
Another problem with a naturalistic program has been widely noticed: 
scientific epistemology has limited relevance to law. As we’ve seen above, 
 
 155. See Levinson, supra note 57, at 1247; see also Rakowski, supra note 56, at 1690–91; cf. 
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naturalistic science self-consciously only applies itself to empirical 
phenomena, but law necessarily contains non-empirical phenomena. Trying to 
apply scientific epistemology to law is like trying to ascertain a painting’s 
beauty with a microscope. Jules Coleman has said, “[T]here is absolutely no 
reason to believe that the facts that interest us as philosophers and social 
theorists are the facts that social and natural scientific theories are interested in 
addressing or are designed to address.”161 Ronald Dworkin has argued that 
“[s]ince morality and the other evaluative domains make no causal claims, 
however, such [scientific, naturalistic] tests can play no role in any plausible 
test for them.”162 And Postema has put it that no one has shown “the relevance 
of the notion of objectivity associated with this [naturalistic] epistemology to 
other areas of experience, judgment, reasoning, and discourse. Some argument 
must be given for thinking that the validity of this conception of objectivity can 
be generalized.”163 
Leiter does not so much offer arguments for the relevance of science to law 
as make unjustified assumptions. He simply assumes that science defines 
reality.164 But it’s just this assumption that needs to be supported by argument. 
It would be just as good to assume ipse dixit that religion defines reality. And 
when pressed for an argument supporting his crucial assumption, he turns to 
the one we’ve already seen fail—that science is successful.165 Naturalists have 
given us no reasons to think scientific epistemology is relevant to the 
normative aspects of law. Norms cannot be eliminated from law. Norms, as 
entities, are not empirically verifiable or observable. Science, being self-
consciously empirical, has no way of telling us anything about norms, and thus 
has limited relevance to important elements of law. 
D. Naturalistic Objectivity Is Not Probative of Law’s Legitimacy 
Recall that we are seeking a conception of objectivity that is probative of 
law’s legitimacy. And one of the considerable flaws in a naturalistic 
conception of objectivity is that it has no such tendency. The reasons for this 
can be summarized as (1) a naturalistic approach to law cannot bridge the is-
ought divide, and (2) identifying law with force, as Naturalism does, tends to 
delegitimize law. 
Naturalism can be descriptive, but it cannot be prescriptive. Perhaps such 
an approach can tell us what law is, but it cannot tell us what law should be. It 
may be possible to perfect the predictive theory of law so that it would always 
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be known exactly how courts would decide legal disputes. And, in a sense, law 
could be deemed objective in that there would be no dispute about the answers 
to legal questions. It would be descriptively objective. Such knowledge would 
be beneficial in many ways, but it would not legitimate law. It is easy to 
imagine a perfectly predictable legal system (defendants always win) the 
predictability of which in no sense legitimated the use of coercive force. 
Whether the naturalistic conception of objectivity is the right conception for 
some descriptive project, it is the wrong conception for the project of inquiring 
into law’s legitimacy. 
In addition to being unable to assess law’s legitimacy, the naturalistic 
conception of law actually tends to delegitimize law by identifying the law 
solely with coercive force. Recall that Holmes, who Posner closely follows,166 
in The Path of the Law, says the study of law is the study of “the prediction of 
the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the courts.”167 
“[A] legal duty so called is nothing but a prediction that if a man does or omits 
certain things he will be made to suffer in this or that way by judgment of the 
court . . . .”168 Or as Posner puts it succinctly, “The ultima ratio of law is 
indeed force.”169 
The naturalist appears to have a preference for identifying law with force 
because force makes a causal difference in the course of our experience. We 
can know when a court makes a ruling; such legal phenomena can be identified 
by the methods of empirical science. But if law were to be identified with non-
empirical entities like normative discourse or reason or morality or the “vaguer 
sanctions of conscience,”170 then a scientific epistemology couldn’t account for 
law. Thus, if we want a scientific account of law, it is convenient to reduce law 
to force. 
Again, this may be fine for some purposes, but it has a deleterious effect 
on law’s legitimacy. “Force is a physical power,” said Rousseau. “To yield to 
force is an act of necessity, not of will; it is at best an act of prudence. In what 
sense can it be a moral duty? . . . [T]he duty of obedience is owed only to 
legitimate powers.”171 When we ask whether law is legitimate, we are asking 
whether there is a good explanation for the use of coercive force. The use of 
coercive force without normative sanction—without reason—would not be 
accepted as legitimate. The identification of law with force provides no way of 
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distinguishing good laws from bad, justice from injustice. As such, a 
naturalistic conception of law and legal objectivity relies on a definition of law 
that itself suggests, or is at least compatible with, a rejection of law’s 
legitimacy. 
The naturalistic fallacy is old.172 So are the criticisms of identifying law 
with force.173 But these arguments still provide good reasons for rejecting the 
naturalistic conception of law and legal objectivity, at least to the extent we are 
concerned with law’s legitimacy. Naturalists might not deny that Naturalism is 
no help in probing law’s legitimacy. “Posner does not blink at the recognition 
that his theory of law offers relatively little reason for anyone to accept the 
moral authority of judicial commands,” Levinson has observed.174 And 
Rakowski has written that “[Posner] suggests, without speaking directly to the 
problems that prompt concern for objectivity, that the ‘pragmatic’ approach to 
judging he lauds need not worry about legitimacy . . . .”175 Some have 
described Posner as finding legitimacy in consensus,176 but this approach is 
akin to and suffers from all the same flaws as identifying law with force. The 
question of legitimacy is not about why the majority who agree with the law 
should accept and obey it, but why the minority who disagree should do so. 
“[T]he point of law is to enable us to act in the face of disagreement,” Jeremy 
Waldron has argued.177 The brute fact of consensus tells us nothing about law’s 
legitimacy. And naturalistic objectivity, for those inquiring about law’s 
legitimacy, has to be rejected. 
IV.  WHY PUBLICITY? 
Unlike Naturalism, the conception of legal objectivity as Publicity is 
probative of law’s legitimacy. Publicity also provides a better account of law, 
both descriptively and prescriptively, based on its explicit incorporation of 
normative discourse. And though there may be an element of circularity or 
contingency in a reason-based system like Publicity, such a quality actually 
improves the likelihood of achieving methodological objectivity. 
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A. Objectivity as Publicity Is Probative of Law’s Legitimacy 
This Article has argued that a naturalistic conception of objectivity cannot 
help us inquire about law’s legitimacy and, in fact, by identifying law as force 
actually hinders any claim to legitimacy.178 Thus, a naturalistic conception of 
objectivity is the wrong conception of objectivity for those interested in 
inquiring into law’s legitimacy. I will now argue that objectivity as Publicity, 
however, can do this job, and I will do so by describing the ways in which 
Publicity can tell us whether certain expectations179 of legitimate government 
are satisfied by legal judgments. 
We expect to be governed democratically. If I say “You can’t do that,” you 
might answer “Says who?” There is an important difference between the 
answers “Says me” and “Says the People of the United States.” The former 
answer is less likely than the latter to convince you that you should comply 
with the demand. And this is not just because I can’t force you to comply; 
perhaps I can. The important difference is that the former answer suggests the 
reason you should comply is private, but the latter answer suggests that the 
reason you should comply is public. People expect to be governed by 
democratic laws, and just as strongly they expect not to be governed by private 
citizens. People are more likely to ascribe legitimacy to democratic laws than 
private fiats. And Publicity can test for this democratic norm by requiring that 
legal judgments be independent, that the reasons for legal judgments transcend 
the judging subject. 
If a legal judgment is based on reasons that transcend the judging subject, 
it provides assurances that legal judgment, and the corresponding application 
of government force, is not based on the factors peculiar to the judge but which 
may not be accepted or shared by others. If a legal judgment is independent, 
then it can be considered a public judgment because the reasons for that 
judgment are not isolated to a few individuals. But a judgment based on 
subjective factors that do not transcend a judging subject would be a private 
judgment because the reasons for the judgment would only be endorsed by the 
subjective judge, not accepted or endorsed by the public. It would not be the 
product of a public, democratic process, and we would call it illegitimate 
because we expect not to be forcefully imposed upon by private parties. Yet 
we do expect and accept being governed by the public; this is the democratic 
norm. Publicity’s requirement that a judgment be based on reasons that 
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transcend the judging subject provides assurances that force is being imposed 
democratically and publicly. 
We also expect to be governed impartially. That a judgment is democratic 
is insufficient to assure its legitimacy because a democratic majority may act 
incorrectly if they have not acted impartially. Not all incorrectness of judgment 
suggests illegitimacy or impartiality.180 For example, if a basketball referee 
misses a call but is not actually trying to “fix” the game, we do not consider his 
judgment illegitimate or impartial. But a certain kind of incorrectness of 
judgment does imply illegitimacy such as when a judgment, though 
democratic, is like that of a private citizen writ large. Such a judgment may be 
independent if the reasons supporting it transcend the judging subject since a 
democratic majority affirms such reasons, but it still may be biased, 
prejudiced, partial or unfair. Thus, Publicity requires that legal judgments be 
based on “proper reasons” and “standards of correctness” and that improper 
factors like bias, idiosyncrasy or ideology be excluded. If a judgment is based 
on proper reasons and standards of correctness, we can be assured that the 
judgment is impartial. 
We also expect to be governed rationally. When we ask about law’s 
legitimacy, we are often asking if there is a good explanation for the use of 
coercive force. We expect to be governed reasonably; we expect not to be 
coerced unreasonably or arbitrarily.181 Rule by force alone implies non-
rationality,182 a condition that prevents the ascription of legitimacy. But we 
affirm being governed by reason (who could maintain that though the law is 
reasonable, he refuses to accept it?). We expect to be able to understand why 
we are being coerced both in theory and in fact. We cannot ascribe legitimacy 
to laws that we cannot comprehend. So we expect to be told good reasons for 
being coerced. Publicity requires that the reasons for judgments refer to 
“standards of correctness,” thereby assuring us that there are, in theory, good, 
comprehensible reasons for the use of force. But Publicity also requires that 
such reasons be given publicly and that they be distinct from the mere opinion 
of the judging subject so that we have access to such reasons and can 
understand them not just in theory but in fact. If standards of correctness are 
available, and judging subjects must publicly give reasons why a judgment 
satisfies those standards, then the ultima ratio of law is not force, but publicly 
accessible reason. 
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We expect incorrect legal judgments to be corrected. The inability to admit 
a mistake is an implicit repudiation of objectivity, a rejection of any measuring 
stick other than one’s own opinion. By requiring that judgments be justified by 
publicly given reasons, moreover, by allowing for standards, reasons, and 
determinations of normative relevance themselves to be changed, Publicity 
creates the possibility of determining that any legal judgment is in error. Law 
thus concedes that it may be wrong in any given instance, a strong sign of 
objectivity and a bulwark (if an imperfect one) against the tyranny of the 
majority. 
All of the foregoing expectations will be disappointed if we are denied an 
opportunity to participate in the deliberative discourse.183 We expect a 
reasonable opportunity to make our case; we expect the opportunity to be 
heard. If we are excluded from the deliberations, it will be cold comfort to be 
told that judgments were made based on proper reasons and standards of 
correctness. Therefore, Publicity requires that all competent members of the 
community have standing and that argument not be prematurely closed. 
We also expect judging subjects to come to some amount of actual 
agreement. I am now suggesting a modification to Postema’s conception of 
Publicity. Postema argues that while strong deliberative agreement is the 
regulative ideal of Publicity, actual agreement is not a required or expected 
result.184 I suggest that public deliberative discourse must achieve some actual 
agreement in order to legitimate its legal judgments and that this requirement 
arises from the structuring features of objectivity. 
Imagine we engaged in public deliberative discourse, but no actual 
agreement was achieved. What could explain this? There are various answers 
but all with the same theme: a failure of reason. Perhaps the judging subjects 
refused to base their judgments on non-subjective factors. In this scenario, 
reasons that transcend a judging subject might be available, but judges are 
unable (consciously or unconsciously) to break away from the gravitational 
pull of subjectivity. Or perhaps judging subjects were willing to base their 
judgments on proper reasons and standards of correctness, but no such reasons 
exist. Or perhaps proper reasons exist, but judges cannot locate them because 
of their own epistemological limitations. Or they exist and judges can locate 
them, but they are too general to help decide particular cases. Perhaps actual 
agreement may not be achieved because the deliberative process was 
prematurely terminated, but why would that have occurred? Perhaps because 
one interest group got the result it wanted and then prevented that result from 
being challenged. Perhaps deliberation was ended because of unreasonable 
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haste. Perhaps there were insufficient resources to allow for reasonable 
deliberation. There are many reasons why public deliberation may fail to yield 
any agreement, but all of them point to the inability to properly reason. 
Whatever the etiology, it appears that failure to achieve some actual agreement 
calls into serious question law’s legitimacy because it suggests a critical failure 
of reason, the animating force of Publicity. 
What kind of actual agreement must be achieved by public deliberation if 
law is to be legitimated? I suggest Publicity requires either (1) a preponderance 
of agreement or (2) increasing agreement over a reasonable period of time. A 
preponderance of agreement based on public deliberative discourse would 
mean that most of those subjected to law could affirm most legal judgments. 
Most of law’s subject would be compelled to ascribe legitimacy to law because 
they agreed with most legal judgments. In a democratic society, we can accept 
being sometimes found in the minority. As Jeremy Waldron has written, “The 
authority of law rests on the fact that there is a recognizable need for us to act 
in concert on various issues or to co-ordinate our behaviour in various areas 
with reference to a common framework, and that this need is not obviated by 
the fact that we disagree among ourselves as to what our common course of 
action or our common framework ought to be.”185 We realize that in a 
democratic government, sometimes we won’t get our way and that fact does 
not make law illegitimate. A preponderance of agreement is consistent with the 
democratic norm of majority rule.186 
In the absence of a preponderance of agreement, we might still ascribe 
legitimacy to law as long as agreement increased over a reasonable amount of 
time.187 Such a result would suggest that, despite widespread disagreement, 
Publicity’s methods were working and moving the political community toward 
a preponderance of agreement. Publicity allots a significant place for 
disagreement, dissent, and even for agreement to be displaced by 
disagreement. At various junctures, deliberative discourse may lead to an 
increase in disagreement such as when new facts are discovered or new 
reasons are recognized as normatively relevant. When this occurs, the 
deliberative process should be granted a reasonable time to attempt to achieve 
legitimating agreement. We should not expect strong deliberative consensus to 
occur overnight. The process should not take forever; otherwise legitimacy 
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would be a pipedream. But a preponderance of agreement may be lost for a 
time, but if within a reasonable time agreement once again increases, we have 
assurances that the injection of new facts and reasons into the discourse has not 
disabled the possibility of legal objectivity. Of course, if agreement must 
increase over time, at some juncture a preponderance of agreement must be 
reached, though not permanently retained. 
Modifying Publicity to require some degree of actual agreement locates 
Publicity in between a conception of objectivity that requires unanimous 
agreement and one that requires only hypothetical agreement. Dr. Heidi Li 
Feldman has attributed the requirement of unanimous agreement to Jurgen 
Habermas and the requirement of only hypothetical agreement to John 
Rawls.188 “According to Habemas,” Feldman writes, “the major condition a 
judgment must meet to qualify for objectivity: [is that] everybody affected by 
the judgment must be able to accept the anticipated consequences of its general 
observance.”189 Moreover, such unanimous agreement must arise from an 
actual, not hypothetical, process of argumentation in which everyone affected 
by the legal judgment must be admitted as participants to the process of 
argumentation.190 Feldman describes this requirement as wildly unrealistic. 
She then notes that Rawls’s conception of objectivity eliminates these 
requirements of an actual dialogue and unanimous agreement, making a 
Rawlsian conception more practical but less attractive.191 “On the Rawlsian 
conception . . . [a] single individual’s judgment, formed in total isolation from 
others, could be objective, if others would (largely) agree with it.”192 While 
this is, for obvious reasons, more feasible than obtaining universal acceptance 
of a judgment after an actual dialogue that included everyone affected by the 
judgment, it is unsatisfactory because no single individual is likely to be aware 
of and sensitive to all the normatively relevant reasons for a judgment and lone 
individuals are unlikely to make decisions independently and based on proper 
reasons.193 Requiring “some degree of actual agreement”194 is more likely to 
ensure that judgments are based on normatively relevant reasons and that 
participation in legal discourse is governed by the overarching aim of 
achieving reasonable common formation of judgment on the basis of the 
reasons and arguments publicly offered. Thus, by arguing that objectivity as 
Publicity requires some degree of actual agreement among judging subjects, I 
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place Publicity, in this regard, in between Rawlsian and Habermasian 
conceptions of objectivity. 
Whether law is legitimate is one of the most important questions we can 
ask. A naturalistic conception of objectivity is unhelpful in answering this 
question. But Publicity is probative of law’s legitimacy.195 This is a strong 
reason why Publicity is an appropriate conception of objectivity for those 
concerned with law’s legitimacy. 
B. A Better Account 
Publicity also offers a better account of law, both descriptively and 
prescriptively, than Naturalism because it accounts for and accommodates 
normative discourse. We have seen that naturalistic objectivity cannot account 
for normative discourse, but Publicity does account for normative discourse in 
the law by embracing normatively relevant reason. Since normative discourse 
cannot be eliminated from law, that Publicity can account for it while 
Naturalism cannot provides an important reason to favor Publicity over 
Naturalism. 
Interestingly, while Naturalism cannot account for normative discourse, 
Publicity does not suffer from the defect of being unable to incorporate 
empirical science. Though the successes of normative discourse are lost on 
Naturalism, the successes of science are not lost on Publicity. Luke Skywalker 
uses a blaster. Again, science is one of the successes of non-empirical reason. 
Publicity can, should, and would utilize empirical science in circumstances 
where science is normatively relevant to legal discourse. Publicity allows us to 
have both normative discourse and science. One of Posner’s abiding criticisms 
of legal thought is its lack of receptivity to science and the “actualities of social 
life,” a flaw that appeared even in Posner’s forerunner, Justice Holmes.196 
Assuming the validity of the argument that legal thought fails to avail itself 
sufficiently of science, such an argument is perfectly at home in Publicity’s 
scheme. Publicity always deems it appropriate to argue for the recognition of 
new normatively relevant reasons or modified criteria of objectivity, for 
example, that legal judgments should incorporate more science. So to the 
extent that Posner is motivated by his desire to see more science in law, 
Publicity can accommodate him, while also accommodating the necessary 
normative discourse. Publicity is a more capacious concept of objectivity than 
Naturalism. 
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Recall Hart’s criticism of the predictive theory of law, that it eliminated the 
internal perspective.197 Hart saw this as a considerable failure because a good 
account should not eliminate features of the phenomenon it is studying, but 
rather do justice to all its features. A parallel complaint can be lodged against 
Naturalism’s elimination of non-empirical norms. Naturalism does not do law 
justice when it attempts to eliminate non-empirical norms. We should not 
eliminate phenomena we “dislike” like a crooked CPA cooking the books. And 
Publicity, unlike Naturalism, doesn’t take this convenient shortcut. As a 
reason-based epistemology, it is able to account for non-empirical norms. But 
it also accounts for other phenomena that it might find easier to ignore. For 
example, disagreement in normative discourse is problematic for Publicity 
because it raises the question of whether a reason-based system is functional. 
But Publicity doesn’t try to eliminate disagreement; it accounts for it by 
describing the important role for disagreement in objective, deliberative 
discourse. A good account should do justice to the phenomena it’s describing. 
Publicity does this for law; Naturalism does not. 
Further, because of Publicity’s explicit incorporation of normative 
discourse into its account, it can offer a program for law and not just a 
description, unlike Naturalism. The scientific account of law can only be 
descriptive, and it cannot supply any goals, ends, or norms, which are 
necessary for a legal program to function. But Publicity accepts normative 
discourse into its account, allowing it to describe as well as prescribe law. For 
example, the reason for a given judgment might be that “due process” was 
satisfied. If in one case the law accepts that due process is a normatively 
relevant reason for a judgment, it follows that in other cases law should 
provide due process. The “is-ought” gap from which Naturalism suffers does 
not afflict Publicity because Publicity is not merely a descriptive conception 
and the “ought” is an accepted part of the law. 
Publicity is a more successful account of law than Naturalism both 
descriptively and prescriptively. Publicity succeeds where Naturalism fails by 
accounting for normative discourse, and without losing the capacity to value 
empirical science. Moreover, where Naturalism is blind and impotent, 
Publicity is able to account for and generate the norms necessary to law. 
C. But Isn’t Reason Culturally Contingent? 
Can a method of practical reason like Publicity198 provide a legitimating 
objectivity if reason itself depends on culture? Posner and Leiter think not. For 
them, such objectivity depends on neither correspondence with reality, nor 
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scientific epistemology, but on cultural, social, and political homogeneity.199 
What looks like objectivity is really just everyone in the room agreeing like so 
many Red Sox fans at Fenway Park. 
If reason’s objectivity rests on the shifting sands of culture, Leiter has 
concerns about Publicity. It has no way of distinguishing between good and 
bad reason.200 Publicity says that the correctness of a judgment is based on 
arguments and reasons.201 But these arguments and reasons, while appearing 
objective to a homogenous culture, may be merely subjective, even if widely 
accepted. Without relying on empirical facts, Leiter says, Publicity has no way 
of distinguishing objective truth from cultural agreement, from a “hegemonic 
convention.”202 (I will only now briefly mention that resting legitimacy on 
social consensus, as pragmatism does, cannot be spared from this same 
criticism.) 
Leiter has given us the example of a hegemonic convention that supports 
the proposition that chocolate is a better flavor of ice cream than vanilla.203 
The Chocolate Convention might be able to give arguments and reasons for its 
position: chocolate is creamier than vanilla; chocolate grips the palate and 
washes away other flavors; vanilla is fleeting.204 To the Convention, these 
arguments and reasons would appear objective because, when recited, 
everyone in the Convention would find them persuasive.205 But they wouldn’t 
be objective; they would only appear that way. The problem for Publicity’s 
conception of objectivity is that it has no way of debunking the Chocolate 
Convention but rather must declare the Chocolate Convention objectively 
correct. 
Fortunately, Publicity is not so blinkered and has a host of safeguards 
against the evils of the Convention. Publicity regards judgments, arguments, 
and reasons as “defeasible and open to criticism from other participants.”206 
“The parameters of objectivity are themselves contestable . . . .”207 Participants 
in deliberative reasoning must be willing to “reconsider their views and 
arguments” and “to admit error.”208 Deliberations must be open “to all 
competent members of the relevant community” and provide a fair opportunity 
 
 199. See supra notes 50–63 and accompanying text. 
 200. Leiter, supra note 15, at 85. 
 201. Postema, supra note 2, at 117. 
 202. Leiter, supra note 15, at 86–87. 
 203. Id. at 86. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Postema, supra note 2, at 120. 
 207. Id. at 118. 
 208. Id. at 120. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2012] METHODOLOGICAL VERSUS NATURALISTIC  95 
to participate.209 And deliberations should continue until strong deliberative 
consensus is reached.210 
Now let’s see if these safeguards can save us from the Chocolate 
Convention. To satisfy Publicity, the reasons given for the superiority of 
chocolate over vanilla must be considered defeasible. They are not set in stone, 
and they are subject to criticism. If a champion for vanilla arises, she must get 
a fair hearing for her argument. Moreover, if the reasons and arguments for 
vanilla outweigh those for chocolate, the Convention must be genuinely 
prepared to admit it was wrong and change its mind. We might worry that 
given the long history and influence of the Convention, the deck is stacked 
against vanilla even if it can get a fair hearing for a strong argument. After all, 
the two-factor test for the superiority of ice cream is familiar: (1) “how creamy 
is it?” and (2) “does it grip the palate?” If the test itself is biased in favor of 
chocolate’s normativity, does vanilla have any chance? It does. Since the 
parameters of objectivity themselves are contestable, the vanilla advocate need 
not hopelessly argue that vanilla is creamier than chocolate. Publicity insists 
that the vanilla advocate be allowed to argue that creaminess and palate-grip 
should not even be the standards by which ice cream is judged: “Dessert 
should be light,” she can argue. “It should be refreshing. It should be vanilla.” 
Now if all of this due process—the purported openness to examining the 
reasons favoring vanilla, the fair hearing and participation, the willingness to 
admit error—is only illusory, then Publicity’s requirements have not been met. 
If it turns out that the members of the Chocolate Convention spent too much 
time as children at chocolate ice cream socials, have too many chocolate 
investments, cannot overcome their personal preference for chocolate, are too 
timid or enculturated to go against public opinion, then their deliberative 
process will not satisfy Publicity. But if they can exclude their subjective 
beliefs, feelings, experiences, and interests, if they are open to changing their 
minds based on reasoned arguments, if they give vanilla its day in court, and if 
their agreement over time moves toward a preponderance, then Publicity is 
satisfied, and, I suspect, so is our desire for a legitimating objectivity. 
It may be true that Publicity’s reasons are contingent.211 Publicity is not 
committed to the ontological status of its reasons and standards. It is a 
methodological, not an ontological, approach to objectivity. It is like 
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procedure, rather than substance. And Publicity concedes that its method 
contains an “element of circularity” since the “criteria of objectivity are fixed 
by substantive argument within law regarding the boundaries of its domain.”212 
But this circularity does not threaten a legitimating objectivity because the 
reasons, arguments, and parameters of objectivity in publicity’s discourse are 
defeasible. The Chocolate Convention doesn’t get to fix the rules for all time. 
Publicity’s judges must always know that they and their previously accepted 
reasons may be wrong. They must be properly open to revising their judgments 
if their error is demonstrated. Even if Publicity’s reasoning is circular, those 
who participate in the discourse can always claim that the circle has been 
drawn too small or large. They can claim the circle should have different 
content. Publicity’s circle is “properly open.” Publicity’s contingency is not a 
bug but a feature, at least for the purpose of investigating legitimacy, because it 
allows law’s subjects not only to argue reasons but to help create the 
normatively relevant reasons to be applied in legal judgments. Contingency 
and circularity do not threaten a legitimating objectivity if our deliberative 
discourse is submitted to the discipline of Publicity. 
Considering the Chocolate Convention also reveals further failings of the 
surprisingly unhelpful Naturalism. Contrary to Leiter’s suggestion, Naturalism 
is not a good way to dispose of the Chocolate Convention.213 Leiter asks us to 
“[i]magine there arose a practice of making arguments about the merits of 
different flavors of ice cream,”214 and this is an analogy to the practice of law 
or perhaps the practice of normative discourse. Leiter wants us to conclude that 
“the parties to the Chocolate Convention are talking nonsense [because] there 
are no objective facts about the ‘tastiness’ of ice cream flavors [because] the 
‘tastiness’ of chocolate . . . is merely subjective.”215 Note something important. 
Leiter wants to use Naturalism to get rid of the dogmatic Convention. But it’s 
not just the Convention that would be talking nonsense. The entire practice of 
debating the merits of ice cream would be nonsense, and so, by analogy, would 
the entire practice of law or the entire practice of normative discourse. If the 
tastiness of chocolate is merely subjective, so is the tastiness of every other 
flavor. It’s not just the Chocolate Convention that should go; it’s the whole 
practice of debating ice cream. This isn’t the result Leiter wanted. He wanted 
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to smart bomb the Convention’s dogma and make the world safe for vanilla. 
But it can’t be done with naturalism. Naturalism isn’t a smart bomb. 
Naturalism is an ontological A-bomb that would eliminate all of the non-
empirical norms that cause, direct, and give meaning to all human activity, 
including law. It is an unhelpful and nihilistic approach to law and legal 
objectivity. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has sought a conception of objectivity that is probative of 
law’s legitimacy. We have considered a naturalistic approach to law that 
conceives of legal objectivity being a function of legal judgments 
corresponding to empirical facts. And we have considered an alternative 
conception, Publicity, which would measure law’s objectivity based on the 
extent to which legal judgments were the products of public deliberative 
reason. 
Some have argued that we should prefer a naturalistic objectivity to 
rationalistic conceptions of objectivity because empirical science (the 
epistemology of Naturalism) has proven to be more successful than non-
empirical forms of discourse. Science has given us immense practical progress; 
non-empirical reason has given us the Salem witch trials, it is alleged. Blasters 
are better than hokey religions, Han Solo claims. This argument is self-
defeating. It blatantly relies on the non-empirical judgment that “science is 
successful,” functionally refuting the claim that non-empirical reason is 
insufficient for determining better and worse ways of reasoning. Moreover, it 
turns out that if science is successful, a fortiori non-empirical normative 
discourse is successful because science itself is a success of normative 
discourse. Scientific enterprises can only arise from and be directed by 
normative discourse. 
Naturalism also turns out to give a poor account of law. Non-empirical 
normative discourse is essential to law, yet Naturalism cannot account for it 
and, worse, attempts to eliminate it. This is just bad accounting, as when Han 
claims Luke’s ability to use a lightsaber with his eyes closed is “just luck.” 
Thus, even at the task to which it is best suited—providing a description of 
law—Naturalism fails: 
[D]escriptive positivism is almost certainly false . . . partly because many of 
the rules and standards identified by the best available tests of positive law 
actually require those who administer them to exercise moral judgment. And it 
is partly because there are inevitably such gaps in positive law and such 
indeterminacy in the meanings of legal rules as to make their administration in 
fact impossible without the exercise of moral judgment.216 
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Naturalism fails even worse when trying to cure the law of problematic 
normative discourse. Normative discourse simply cannot be eliminated from 
law, and Naturalism’s efforts to do so are futile or nihilistic. All of this stems 
from the fact that the epistemology of Naturalism, empirical science, has only 
limited relevance to law because law necessarily includes non-empirical 
elements. 
A naturalistic conception of law also is completely unsuited to providing 
us information about law’s legitimacy. Even if the law could be made 
scientifically objective, such objectivity would in no way legitimate law. There 
might be projects for which Naturalism suggests a helpful conception of 
objectivity, but the project of testing law’s legitimacy is not one of them. 
Publicity, however, is tailored to inquire about law’s legitimacy. It helps us 
know whether our expectations of democratic rule, impartiality, public 
rationality, fair hearings, admitting error, and strong deliberative consensus are 
being met by law. Publicity also provides a satisfactory account of law, 
succeeding where Naturalism failed, by explicitly incorporating normative 
discourse, yet without sacrificing empirical fact. And Publicity can answer the 
objection that a reason-based system cannot be objective because reason is 
culturally contingent. Since we are seeking an objectivity that legitimates law, 
the contingency of Publicity’s reasons is a feature not a bug because Publicity 
allows for law’s subjects to participate in not just the arguing of reasons but the 
making of the reasons. If legal judgments meet the requirements of Publicity, 
law’s subjects should be willing to ascribe to it a legitimating objectivity. If 
not, then they should not. Either way, Publicity is a conception of legal 
objectivity that is probative of law’s legitimacy. 
In this debate between Publicity and Naturalism, there is a way to détente. 
It could be recognized that Naturalism and Publicity are fundamentally 
intended for different projects. The naturalist is seeking to answer the 
descriptive question “What is law?” while rationalistic Publicity is primarily 
asking “Is law legitimate?” or “What should law be?” Different projects can 
require different tools. Physicists are not expected to exegete scripture, and 
clergy are not expected to run particle accelerators; likewise naturalists can 
prioritize empirical science while rationalists emphasize non-empirical 
reason.217 There is no need for conflict between different people doing 
different projects using different tools. But there can be no truce as long as 
naturalists fail to acknowledge the limits of empirical science, imperially 
assuming that reality is identified and defined by empirical science and 
denying ontological standing to the non-empirical. 
A better and more radical solution is also available. Naturalists could 
recognize the glaring defects in their philosophy. They have no source of 
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legitimate norms. Yet they could find them in normative discourse. This 
wouldn’t require them to forsake their love of science. It would allow them to 
put their love of science and empirical fact to good use. Han Solo saves the day 
when he joins the Rebellion and helps Luke destroy the Death Star. 
Empirically-minded thinkers may very well do the same for law, but only if 
they embrace normative discourse. Science has nothing to fear from reason. 
The rationalist loves science. After all, he invented it. The odds seem low of 
thinkers like Posner or Leiter embracing moral philosophy, normative 
discourse, or religion, but it would be a major event in the law. 
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